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THE ENTANGLED EASTERN FRONT AND THE MAKING OF THE UKRAINIAN STATE: A FORGOTTEN PEACE – A FORGOTTEN WAR AND NATION-BUILDING

Soviet Russia Wages War against Ukraine

All the efforts – unwitting and witting – of the several 'authors' of Ukrainian statehood notwithstanding, there were always powerful counter-forces opposing and resisting the idea of Ukrainian independence. Those policies and recommendations came from equally entangled networks of Russians, Poles, Germans, Austro-Hungarians, Ukrainians, Jews, and others. Most importantly, Soviet Russia can better be described as among the 'unmakers' of the Ukrainian state, together with the White Russians and the new Polish Republic to Ukraine's west. As noted above, the Soviet government in Petrograd recognized the Ukrainian Republic on several occasions, even while simultaneously threatening it with an ultimatum and war and while endorsing a rival Ukrainian government in Kharkiv allied with Russia. In these early weeks and months of Soviet Russian–Ukrainian encounters, the two most important Bolsheviks in the 'unmaking' of Ukraine, Leon Trotsky and Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko, had – perhaps ironically but not unusually for imperial Russia – their origins in Ukraine, or at least the territories that the Rada claimed for Ukraine. Trotsky, a Russified Jew, was born and spent his childhood in Yanovka near Kharkiv and worked for much of his early adulthood as a correspondent for the leading Russian-language Kyiv newspaper, Kievskaia mysl. Antonov-Ovseenko, a Russified half-Ukrainian, was born into the family of a Russian army officer in Chernihiv. Stalin, as the new government's expert on nationality matters, also shaped policy towards Ukraine, as did Vladimir Lenin, of course, the most influential of Bolshevik leaders on most issues; both had little prior contact with Ukraine, though Lenin had followed political developments there before the war and written about Ukraine–Russian relations[1].

After the failed offensives of late December 1917, the Bolsheviks reviewed their tactics and a second assault was also placed under the command of Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko, who had as his chief of staff the notorious former Left

Socialist Revolutionary Mikhail Muraviov, recently commandant of Petrograd. Muraviov's troops numbered approximately 11,200 men against estimated 11,400 troops defending the capital. He announced the outlines of his occupation regime on February 4, in Order No 9, in which he called on his troops 'to exterminate without mercy in Kyiv all officers and students of military academies, haidamaks[2], monarchists, and all enemies of the revolution'. A few days later, in Order No. 14, Muraviov authorized terror for three days until February 11, when a new order prohibited unauthorized searches, arrests and lynchings. Georgii Lapchinskyi, a member of the presumptive Soviet Ukrainian government, acknowledged 'as a participant and witness of these events' that Muraviov's onslaught made bombardment an 'entirely normal and expedient form of mass revolutionary terror'[3]. Even Antonov-Ovseenko, one of Muraviov's most loyal advocates in the Bolshevik leadership, admitted that his behavior made him 'an occupier, foreigner-migrant (prishelets) from the Soviet north' in the eyes of the Kyiv inhabitants'[4].

The number of victims in the capture of Kyiv is difficult to determine precisely[5]. The best estimate is that the number of officers murdered on the streets was 2,576. Doroshenko assessed that 3,000 persons were killed on the first day of the occupation of the city and the total number of victims and prisoners came to over 10,000[6]. The terror was primarily directed against 'nationalist' Ukrainians and officers of the Russian army, but also against Ukrainians sympathetic to the Soviet regime, including some Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries, for example, who fell victim to the violence. Lapchinskyi admitted that 'our soldiers were not always able to distinguish well' and thus Ukrainians in general suffered, 'simply Ukrainian elements, even those favorable to Soviet power'[7]. Lenin later commended Muraviov and his troops for the capture of Kyiv when he announced his appointment to command the war against Romania[8].

Not surprisingly, this first war of Soviet Russia against Ukraine and the terror occupation of Muraviov poisoned relations between the two revolutionary governments, but even sat uneasily with Ukrainian Bolsheviks. Again, our best witness is Lapchinskyi, who recalled that 'the terrifying effect of the five-day-long bombardment and of the essentially class vengeance of the revolutionary army which had driven the Central Rada from Kyiv, was so strong, that remembrances about the "horrible Muraviov days" in Kyiv among the bourgeois Kyiv population and among the working classes over the entire USSR acquired truly legendary proportions'. (Muraviov reported to Lenin that he 'took 10 million from the Kyiv bourgeoisie' and he 'gave recompense to the troops from part of the contribution' while he used the rest for the organization of work for unemployed and to aid families of casualties from the local people 'as well as from my armies'[9].)

The 'father' of the Ukrainian nation, the historian and statesman Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, wrote on February 17, 1918, shortly after the violence, 'These are,

in the main, the settings of the catastrophe through which our Ukraine had to pass on the threshold of its new life, that great cleansing by fire, in which it seems various old prejudices, outlived traditions and views had to burn away [...] Not only men are being killed in it, but ideas as well. Not only cities are being destroyed, but traditions too [...] There burn historical, cultural, economic and all other ties of the Ukrainian people with the Russian people [...] Earlier, the Ukrainian people concerned themselves with bureaucracy and government. Now we, by the most immediate means, must wage the struggle between the nations themselves – Great Russian and Ukrainian'[10].

Khrystiuk also recalled the war as a tragedy and 'one of the most difficult and painful pages of the Russian and Ukrainian revolutions'. He saw this as the 'first war between genuine democracies in the world (in the 20th century), indeed, between a people-workers and peasant – and another people'. He lamented that the 'centralist-occupation conduct of the Bolsheviks in Ukraine did more to discredit the slogans of socialist revolution and soviet power than any enemies of the toiling people's liberation'. He saw it as leading to a general exacerbation of the national struggle in Ukraine and to the growth of nationalism, both Ukrainian and Russian, and to some extent Jewish as well. Finally, it marked a 'shattering of the forces of Ukrainian revolutionary democracy, their turn to the right, and the growth of nationalist sentiment'. Yet, with Khrystiuk's seemingly indomitable spirit of optimism, he goes on to remind us that no misfortune is without its good side – and that this war 'placed the problem of Ukraine's national-political rebirth on the international agenda. The Russian Bolshevik, like the reactionary imperialist bourgeoisie, was accustomed to view Ukraine as an eternal colony of Russia and the Ukrainian people as passive, unconscious, uncultured, as a Ukrainian ethnographic mass; he viewed the Ukrainian people as incapable of expressing enough moral, intellectual and physical strength to be in the revolution with its own autonomous life; this Bolshevik, having broken the bayonets of his rifles in Ukraine (albeit on German helmets) was forced to change his views of the Ukrainian national rebirth'[11].

The Road to the German-Austrian Occupation of Ukraine

After several weeks of negotiations in Brest-Litovsk and several journeys by all the negotiators to their respective capitals to review the latest decisions and their acceptability, a treaty was signed with Ukraine that achieved, remarkably, most of what the Ukrainian delegates had sought from the start. One of the victims, however, of the final decisions was the recently declared wish for transparency and open diplomacy. Czernin agreed to the Ukrainian demand to cede Kholm to Ukraine, a decision he rightly predicted would be denounced among the empire's Poles. Similarly, he agreed to the right of Ukrainians in the Habsburg lands to self-determination in the form of an eventual separate crownland for Galicia

and Bukovyna. This, too, was in blatant violation of the 'Austro-Polish solution' and, therefore, could not be made public. When word got out despite all efforts, Poles broke out in rioting and Poles' faith in Austria's benevolent role was severely impaired[12]. The Ukrainians, in turn, chose not to reveal the details of the promises they made to the Central Powers to deliver up to a million poods of grain from Ukraine. For some in the German elite, the treaty with Ukraine was not welcome, largely because many Germans preferred to deal with a Russia, however crippled at the moment and even a Bolshevik Russia, rather than to entertain the break-up of such an important European power. But the Germans had the least to lose – and the least to hide – in these negotiations; their primary aim was to shut down the fighting on the Eastern Front so as to launch the 'final, decisive' offensive to end the war before the American expeditionary forces could reach Europe and begin to change the balance of forces to Germany's disadvantage.

With the outbreak of the Bolshevik war against Ukraine, the Central Powers now had to face the perhaps not so unpredictable consequences of the peace they had just signed. Nothing in the treaty dealt with any possible occupation or the obligations of the Central Powers to the new Ukrainian state. According to Fritz Fischer and his historiographical allies, the Central Power occupation of Ukraine was part of the master plan to 'grab world power' and establish an eastern empire. But the story is not so straightforward. Contrary to Fischer's argument, however, Ludendorff made it clear that 'no conquests were to be sought in Russia', again, the primary motive being the need to transfer all available forces to the Western Front. Kühlmann opposed any resumption of fighting with Bolshevik Russia and worried about how Vienna would react to this after working so hard to halt the fighting. Still, Ludendorff realized that Germany would need to establish some kind of order in the east and to maintain a strongly fortified frontier 'against the ever-spreading poison of Bolshevism', and this coincided with the Ukrainians' request for military assistance against the Russian invasion. Ludendorff won the Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor over to his position, despite Kühlmann's continuing apprehensions[13].

Indeed, as Kühlmann had anticipated, the allies did not immediately agree to resume the war against the Bolsheviks. Indeed, Vienna and Berlin entered a new stage in their conflict-ridden partnership[14]. Although the Bulgarian representative at Brest had urged Czernin to offer military help to the Ukrainians as early as January 29, 1918[15] , Emperor Karl refused at first to authorize his troops to join the Germans in their occupation, arguing that this was a police action and not a military one, thereby not covered under the terms of their alliance. Czernin supported his empire's participation in the occupation, but wanted to use the Ukrainians' new demands to undo their recent concessions on Kholm and the crownland. This proposal met with opposition from Ludendorff and Hoffmann,

who had done so much to bolster the Ukrainians' hand with Czernin. Ludendorff and the German leadership more generally were outraged and hinted that the desperately needed grain that Austria-Hungary was counting on would not deliver itself. Eventually, the fear that all the grain and foodstuffs would fall into the hands of the Germans brought Vienna around to joining the occupation[16].

With the expectation that the government might fall any moment, Ludendorff also acknowledged that Germany would provide military assistance, but only if the UPR expressly requested it. The Ukrainians, for their part, very reluctantly accepted their need for German 'assistance', but hoped that the Germans would not interfere in the internal affairs of Ukraine. The Austro-Hungarian delegate, Friedrich von Wiesner, advised Sevriuk to turn primarily to Vienna because otherwise the Germans would have the predominant or exclusive role and that would not be in the interests of Ukraine[17]. Sevriuk conveyed the UPR message to the Central Powers requesting military assistance; later, he, Liubynskyi and Levytskyi drafted appeals to the 'freedom-loving peoples of Austria-Hungary and Germany' not to remain indifferent to their hard struggle for their existence against 'the enemy of our freedom, having entered our land by force, as it did 254 years ago, to enslave the Ukrainian people by fire and sword', but ultimately all this proclamation called for was to defend the northern borders of Ukraine[18]. Sevriuk proposed to the Central Powers that they release Ukrainian prisoners of war from their camps and train and arm them for the ongoing war with Russia. The UPR hoped they could build their own army and hence allow German troops to leave Ukraine as soon as possible. The Ukrainians had to renounce the secret protocol on the Kholm province in exchange for Austro-Hungarian agreement to participate in the occupation[19]. Austria-Hungary continued to disappoint the Ukrainians; the Reichsrat ultimately failed to ratify the treaty that had been signed with so much fanfare on February 9, whereas the other allies did deliver on their promises: Bulgaria on July 15, followed by Germany on August 24 and Turkey on August 22, 1918[20].

These expectations and hopes would quickly be dashed on all sides by the politics of the occupation, but both sides had very different starting points. The Central Powers were indeed aware that the Ukrainian government, with whose representatives they were negotiating a separate peace, was facing a military offensive from the Soviet Russian government in Petrograd; furthermore, the Central Powers signed the treaty with a Ukrainian government that was already in exile from the Bolshevik bombardment of Kyiv and the reign of terror that the troops under the command of Mikhail Muraviov unleashed on enemies of various sorts. Two members of the Ukrainian government were killed in the violence, but the rest escaped to Zhytomyr.

Against this backdrop, State Secretary Kühlmann, in what was perhaps his most important contribution to the making of the Ukrainian state, offered a fascinating

and very profound statement of German policy in signing the treaty with Ukraine in a series of statements to the Reichstag committees that were debating the peace. Several Reichstag deputies had criticized fundamental aspects of the treaty that the Government submitted for discussion. (As further evidence of the entangled character of the history of the treaty, Kühlmann reported to the Reichstag committee that the Austrian Prime Minister, Ernst von Seidler, was making a similar set of statements in the Vienna Reichsrat 'today'[21].) Kühlmann chose to address 'the very difficult question as to the origin of a state, and the special question as to how the German Government arrived at the conclusion that a state had come into existence in Ukraine'. He acknowledged that 'an absolute rule' on this matter did not exist, and expressed some hope that the League of Nations (!) would take the matter up. But, in the absence of the 'absolute rule', Kühlmann cited the (Fourth) Universal of the Ukrainian People's Republic of January 24, 1918 as an important foundation. He recalled an important moment of transition after the recent Christmas interval in the negotiations, when a large delegation arrived, headed by Holubovych, and 'took part in the negotiations as an independent delegation, without any opposition or protest'. Kühlmann recounted his argument with Trotsky, after the Soviet delegation leader had changed his mind about his earlier recognition of the UPR. As evidence of Ukraine's legitimacy, Kühlmann reminded Trotsky that 'even Entente States had equally recognized the Ukraine, and have sent diplomatic representatives there [...].' He noted that Germany had similarly recognized the Finnish Republic as a precedent.

A further difficult question concerned the current status of the Ukrainian government, which by the time of the Reichstag discussion was no longer in Kyiv. Kühlmann assured the Reichstag that 'when the treaty was signed, Kyiv was in the hands of the UPR'. He admitted that 'almost as great chaos exists at present in Ukraine as in Northern Russia'[22], but he soberly observed that 'the uncertainty as to whether a government will be permanent in times such as we are living in now ought not in any case to prevent our concluding peace with it'. Finally, Kühlmann reassured the deputies that no alliance existed between Germany and Ukraine; 'no such alliance has been suggested by the Ukraine, nor have proposals been either made or received by us in this respect'. In this remarkable defense of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state, Kühlmann revealed the dilemmas of democratic states, peace, and occupation that have helped determine our most recent wars.

In a final compliment to the tough Ukrainian negotiators, Kühlmann told the Reichstag deputies, 'I can assure you quite objectively that the idea that the Ukrainians came like bashful boys, on whom we pressed province after province, is an absolute fiction.' And in his memorandum submitting the treaty to the Reichstag, Chancellor von Hertling conceded that 'thanks to the practical attitude of the Ukrainian delegates, an attitude which was not intended for propaganda [understood, here like the Bolsheviks], but directed to the object of a

real understanding, it was possible, in a short time, to come to an agreement concerning the large number of, in part, very complex and difficult questions resulting from the first conclusion of peace in the present world war'.

Several Reichstag speeches (here Gustav Stresemann and Adolf Groeber) characterized this as 'the first peace treaty', and 'in fact, the preliminary condition, the foundation, for the peace treaties to follow'. Kühlmann himself promoted this idea of the treaty with Ukraine as having 'a certain significance and importance as a pattern – since experience shows us that in diplomacy instruments already at hand serve more or less as bases for subsequent proceedings – the restoration of legal relations generally is completely secured, and that we can communicate with this important part of the former Russian Empire with complete security of rights, both diplomatic and politico-commercial'[23]. Along these lines, Chancellor Hertling reportedly pledged to Ukrainian Prime Minister Holubovych that German troops would be withdrawn as soon as the Ukrainians requested, having fulfilled their mission[24].

With these hopes and expectations on both sides, the Germans began their advance into Ukraine and against Russia to the north on February 18, 1918. Ludendorff briefly contemplated waging war against the Bolsheviks without their alliance partners, but the Austrians finally began their advance nearly two weeks later at the end of February. However much Ludendorff might have wanted to proceed without the Austrians, the Germans did not have enough troops to secure even the limited occupation they planned for, let alone for the one that they could not have and did not plan for[25]. Both the Central Powers and the Ukrainians saw it in their interests to present the occupation as a joint campaign for the liberation of Ukraine from Bolshevik terror. The Ukrainians proposed several variants of plans to allow Ukrainian troops, either Galician Ukrainians serving in the Austrian army or Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in German and Austrian captivity, and the Germans agreed to some of the suggestions, including the deployment of troops loyal to the Rada, which answered to the Military Secretariat and was nominally independent of German command. The Germans were still eager to transfer as many troops as possible from the Eastern Front, so they were particularly receptive to Ukrainian suggestions to supplement their forces with some kinds of Ukrainian units. The proclamation by the Council of People's Ministers (the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic) described the German troops as coming to Ukraine 'to assist Ukrainian Cossacks, divisions of Ukrainian POWs, the Sharpshooters from Galicia'; they are 'coming to liquidate confusion and anarchy and to bring peace and order to our land' to give the Council of People's Ministers 'the power to build an independent UPR'. It went on to reassure the citizens of Ukraine that 'these friendly troops will fight the enemies of the UPR [...] and this is a struggle against violators and plunderers, but these troops have no hostile intentions against us'[26].

The Occupation and the Limitation of Sovereignty of the Ukrainian State[27]

The occupation quickly doomed all the good intentions on all sides. Khrystiuk recalled how the Central Rada returned to Kyiv full of determination to implement new laws (above all the land law that was enacted during the Bolshevik siege of Kyiv), but they 'did not count on the fact of the Austro-German army becoming the decisive factor for the internal policy of the republic'. Moreover, 'the entire bourgeoisie in Ukraine immediately saw in the reactionary German army its natural allies and their defenders against the "socialist destroyers"'[28]. The Germans in particular wanted the Rada to re-establish its presence throughout Ukraine and to make clear that the German forces were in Ukraine by invitation of that government and not as an army of conquest and pure occupation[29].

Besides the ongoing conflict between the German and Austrian alliance partners, Fedyshyn sums up the 'story of the development and implementation of German plans and policies in the Ukraine during the occupation' as 'to a large extent the story of rivalry and cooperation between the Imperial Chancellery and its Foreign Office, on the one hand, and the Supreme Army Command, or more correctly General Ludendorff, on the other'. Secondary roles were played by the Ministries of War, Navy, Treasury, Economy, and Colonies[30]. One revealing conflict over Ukraine policy pit the German Foreign Office, which wanted to keep some hand in relations with the Ukrainian state, against the High Command it feared was usurping its authority with the occupation. Ludendorff wanted to send a lower-level diplomat not to get in the way of General Wilhelm Groener, but the Foreign Office insisted on and won the nomination of Philipp Alfons Mumm von Schwarzenstein, an experienced, senior diplomat, but one with no prior experience in Eastern Europe or Russia[31]. The Dual Monarchy also initially wanted to send a lower-level diplomat to Kyiv so as not to cause difficulties back in Vienna, particularly with the Poles. In the end, however, Kyiv also received a full Ambassador, Count János Forgách. These two ambassadorial appointments represented a commitment to respect the sovereignty of the Ukrainian government. The Germans and Austrians agreed to divide the occupation into two zones, but with Kyiv being held jointly. Fedyshyn concludes that this agreement relegated the Dual Monarchy 'to a secondary position as an occupying power'. It also implied that diplomatic representatives were also destined to play a secondary role to the military occupation authorities[32].

General Groener was the key official overseeing the occupation in his position as chief-of-staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the German forces in Ukraine, Field Marshal Hermann von Eichhorn. Although the commands and orders went out under Eichhorn's signature, it was Groener who combined responsibility for the war economy and politics. In his own words, his job was 'to put the Ukrainian government back into the saddle, to lend it the support of the German armed might, and above all, to extract from it grain and other food-

stuffs – the more, the better!'[33] Groener, whose professional military specialty as a quartermaster inclined him to think in economic terms, came to see the occupation of Ukraine as an important means of countering the deleterious effects of the Allied blockade on the Central Powers' ability to sustain the war effort. Kühlmann, in his speech to the Reichstag, had hinted at the possible consequences of the occupation and the treaty. He argued that Germany had an interest in maintaining the railroads in Ukraine to ensure the shipment of grain and other foodstuffs, but 'we shall not go beyond this and shall refrain from all political involvement in that country'. But the economic rationale of Groener and the occupation more broadly led to a 'mission creep' whereby the initial plans for going no further east than Kyiv then expanded to include Kharkov, the Donets Basin to protect the coal from the Bolsheviks, then one third of the Don and into Georgia! The Austro-Hungarian commander in Ukraine, General Alfred Krauss, concluded that this expansive German entry into Ukraine was 'the surest road to Mesopotamia, Arabia, Baku and Persia' and that from Kyiv, Ekaterinoslav and Sevastopol, the 'road leads [...] to Batum and Trapezunt'[34].

Fedyshyn characterized the German's 'impossible situation'. While strengthening the government with which they had made a treaty and which they had promised to support militarily and politically, they were at the same time weakening and undermining it through their extreme demands'. Very soon, General Groener found himself deeply involved in Ukrainian politics, which led to the removal of the Rada and the establishment of a new government in Kyiv on 29 April 1918, that of the Hetmanate of Pavlo Skoropadskyi. Moreover, as Horak concludes, the Germans in particular were very aware that the UPR that they had overthrown had far more legitimacy, based on the membership of the political parties making up the government, than the Hetman's cabinet, with its much more limited representation, could claim. He insists that after April 29 Ukraine can 'best be described as a state with only limited sovereignty making Skoropadskyi's regime more a recipient than a holder of political power'[35].

Almost immediately after the German army restored the Rada to Kyiv, the Germans had begun to consider alternatives to their treaty obligations, including ruling the country under martial law as a German Governor-Generalship, closer in status to a conquered territory or colony[36]. The Foreign Office prevented this from happening, but General Eichhorn steadily took measures to impose elements of martial law, including the shutting down of protests, strikes, newspapers, and the insistence that German military courts try Ukrainian citizens for an expanding array of violations and crimes. The Germans actually followed the Austrians in their 'hard approach' to food requisitioning. Peasant resistance was met with arrests and punitive expeditions. Emperor Karl gave the army a free rein on 1 April 1918. Although Ludendorff initially objected to these methods,

on April 6 Eichhorn proclaimed an order on the cultivation of the land, and gave the signal for the restoration of private property and the reversal of the UPR's recent land reform[37]. Protests from the UPR ministers were to no avail.

A friendly voice for Ukraine was lost when Hoffmann was transferred to Kovno with the headquarters of the Eastern Front. Ambassador Mumm was left as the lone voice advocating a strong Ukrainian state, as Fedyshyn put it, 'against all those who were prepared to forget diplomatic niceties and international agreements and who urged that Germany simply "help herself to whatever she needs to be able to survive and wage war, through the use of naked force if necessary, and irrespective of the wishes of the Ukrainian government, which could always be replaced by another one, or simply done away with"'[38]. The Austrian representatives, both in the army and diplomatic corps, were not Mumm's allies[39]. Groener lost all confidence in the Rada government, whose administrative apparatus was 'completely shattered, unreliable, and totally incapable of any serious effort' and, furthermore, he criticized the German Foreign Office for treating Ukraine 'as though it were a normal and equal partner'[40]. Colonel Ulrich von Stolzenberg, German military attaché in Kyiv, was also an important actor and considered very friendly towards the Ukrainians. It was he who suggested that the Germans send some 'socialist' deputies to exercise some 'sobering influence' on the Rada[41].

But even Mumm became increasingly exasperated with the UPR government. In another clear statement of the Ukrainian state's limited sovereignty, Colonel Stolzenberg encouraged Mykola Liubynskyi, now the Rada Foreign Secretary, to raise with the Austrians the question as to when their forces might withdraw. When Liubynskyi took matters further and posed the same question to the Germans, the reaction was alarm and efforts to avoid a response. The Ukrainians proceeded to draft a 'status of forces' agreement that would regulate the behavior of the occupation troops on Ukrainian soil[42]. Mumm replied two weeks later that 'without German military assistance none of them would be in power and the withdrawal of German forces from the Ukraine would result in immediate expulsion of the Rada and return to chaos and lawlessness'. Fedyshyn concludes sadly, 'Thus, the actions of the German and Austrian military forces in the Ukraine counted for more than all the written agreements and other solemnly undertaken commitments put together, although most of them were never openly repudiated'[43].

As with the peace treaty with Ukraine and the subsequent occupation, so, too, the German involvement with the coup by General Skoropadskyi against the UPR was largely a response to unexpected circumstances. Groener had ruled out direct Austro–German military rule in large measure because he judged German forces in Ukraine to be inadequate to establish an effective occupation over so large a territory. Instead, he 'recommended the maintenance of an independent Ukrainian state – which he viewed as a mere cloak to facilitate the continuation of German control and exploitation of the country'[44]. Skoropadskyi

appeared on the scene relatively recently and agreed to the crippling conditions on Ukrainian sovereignty that the Germans drew up[45]. The coup provoked protests both in Ukraine and also in Germany.

Although Fedyshyn argues that the Reichstag played little role in Ukraine policy by this time, the government, nonetheless, had to respond to criticism there, most notably from Center Party leader Matthias Erzberger, who denounced the ouster of the Rada government as 'clearly prearranged, and which could only be described as a German coup d'etat carried out by the military'. He objected to the composition of the new government and lamented the regrettable consequences for Germany, 'A German soldier can no longer show himself unarmed in Kyiv. German soldiers have already been shot down. The bitterness against Germany is increasing.' He concluded, 'That is not the way to attain the first object of our intervention, namely securing the surplus grain supplies for the German people.' Moreover, with the increasing hatred of Germany and the Russophile elements among the new ministers, 'a new Great Russia is taking its rise from Kyiv under German protection'[46]. In the last sentence, Erzberger was reacting to a report by Paul Rohrbach, back from his visit to Kyiv, in which he described the Hetman as 'more Russian than Ukrainian' wanting 'to lead Ukraine back to Russia'. Ironically, the Germans in Kyiv found themselves greater advocates of Ukrainian independence than the Hetman himself, who they knew was very comfortable with the Russian nationalists seeking refuge in his Ukraine. Moreover, Russian military officers, members of the Kadet Party, and other Russian national 'elements' were streaming into Ukraine from Bolshevik Russia and adding to the considerable pressures on Skoropadskyi to steer his state towards a 'Russian' solution. Mumm pressured both the Hetman and the Ukrainian socialist oppositionists to reconcile their differences and the Ukrainian socialists to join the government. All these efforts were in vain[47].

By the time Vice-Chancellor Friedrich von Payer answered these parliamentary objections in May 1918, the tone of the Government had changed from its initial defense of the sovereignty of a neutral, Ukrainian state towards a more asymmetrical power relationship with a dependent Ukrainian state. He spoke of 'the aim of our policy toward the border peoples [...] is to live with them for the future in peace and friendship'. He asserted that it was in Germany's and the border peoples' interests 'that we should draw near to each other in matters of policy, economics, and Kultur, and, so far as is feasible, in military affairs also'. But his special hope was 'for advantages with regard to the assurance of our food supply, and what is comprised under the general term of colonization'. He went on to express his complete agreement that 'we should not interfere in the internal affairs of the Ukraine. But that obviously has some limits, firstly, in view of the object of our entry into the Ukraine, viz., the establishment of order; and secondly, in regard to the security of our troops'. Finally, he defended the coup

against the Rada and the field-sowing order by Field Marshal von Eichhorn as dictated by the military situation[48]. The Austrians, though they supported the coup against the Rada, never accepted the legitimacy of the Hetmanate and insisted that is was an 'unrecognized protectorate'[49]. So the first peace treaty of the war ended in an occupation supporting a Ukrainian dictatorship, also quite inefficient in doing the occupiers' bidding, but still preferable, in German eyes, to the previous Rada government.

Groener, despite his role in the ultimate 'unmaking' of the Ukrainian state, like many of his predecessors who spent time in Kyiv, also cultivated a friendship with the Hetman, Skoropadskyi, that lasted long after Skoropadskyi sought refuge in Germany after the collapse of his government. Groener arranged what was possibly the crowning moment in Skoropadskyis career as Hetman, namely, a visit to Berlin and Spa for an audience with Kaiser Wilhelm and his brother, as well as with the German High Command at the beginning of September 1918. After the war, General Groener helped the Hetman organize a Ukrainian research institute in Wannsee that promoted his monarchist ideas. Groener strongly opposed the plan to evacuate the east immediately, arguing, 'it was impossible for us [Germans] to withdraw our protecting hand from the Baltic peoples, the Finns, and the Ukrainians, whom we liberated and whose confidence we had won'[50]. And Hoffmann, too, confided to his diary, 'I am sorry for the people whose territory we are handing over to the Bolsheviks'[51]. Hoffmann concludes his memoirs with some reflections on the mission of General Groener and the ongoing threat presented by Bolshevik Russia. Hoffmann was revolted by the reports of Bolshevik atrocities and felt that 'it was impossible, as a respectable man, to stand inactive and allow a whole nation to be butchered'. He argued for renouncing the treaty with the Soviet government, and marching on Moscow to install a 'better' Russian government and had entered into negotiations with representatives of the monarchists and Whites[52]. Prince Maximilian von Baden also explains Groener's and Hofmann's attachment to Ukraine, 'Like General Hoffmann he had long been on outpost duty in the East, protecting and maintaining order, filled with the consciousness of our power and of the responsibility which was laid upon us. These Eastern soldiers had "Ethical Imperialism" in their bones at a time when the politicians were still impervious to it. They felt that not only the nation's word but their own honour was at stake. They felt it impossible for us to withdraw our protecting hand from the Baltic peoples, the Finns, and the Ukrainians, whom we had liberated and whose confidence we had won'[53].

Conclusions

To return to the 'new order' of the original title, in concluding his chapter on the Peace Treaty Fischer describes General Hoffmann's reply to critics of the treaty he helped to negotiate 'by pointing out that the Allies technically annulled

the German-Russian Treaty at Versailles, but used the situation created by Germany as the basis for their re-organization of Eastern Europe when they set up the ring of states nicknamed the cordon sanitaire'[54]. Paul Rohrbach, one of Germany's most influential Ukraine experts, agreed that Hoffmann was one of two people in his experience who understood the tragically lost opportunities with Ukraine. The other was the American Secretary of State under Wilson, Robert Lansing, who wrote that Wilson had discredited the idea of the right to self-determination when many peoples of the Russian Empire, including the Ukrainians, were denied the right to independent states[55]. Prince Maximilian, who was an early advocate of just and democratic peace, likewise understood Wilson and the Versailles peace to be a betrayal of all the promises made in the Fourteen Points and another of the many lost opportunities of the peace[56]. Khrystiuk, too, joined the many critics of the Versailles settlements as a new imperial division of the post-war world in favor of the victorious powers. Indeed, he offered his history of the Ukrainian revolutions as part of the story of 'intensified efforts on the part of oppressed peoples everywhere to throw off the shameful and heavy yoke of national oppression'. He described the behavior of the French diplomats towards the Directory government as little different from that of the German and Bolshevik imperialists and judged that the rhetoric of self-determination was nothing but the mask of the 'Entente imperialists'[57]. Those treaties were framed in terms of revenge and punishment and far from the spirit of the first treaty of the war, that of the Central Powers with Ukraine.

The powers most hostile to the idea of a Ukrainian state and nation remained the Russians, both the Bolsheviks and the Whites. The Whites were the most resistant to recognizing Ukraine as part of their new order; instead, Anton I. Denikin and his entourage viewed Kyiv as a Russian city and as the launching place for the recovery of a strong, united, and indivisible Russia. The Whites insisted that Ukraine was not real, but referred to it as the historical southwest provinces and New Russia. But the Bolsheviks, by contrast, were obliged by their own state weakness and their own desperate demand for foodstuffs in a starving Petrograd and other parts of Russia to behave as if they took their own rhetoric of national self-determination seriously. Even as they were in the same document recognizing the UPR and also delivering ultimatums and threatening war if the UPR did not in fact subordinate its armed forces and its statehood to Bolshevik Russia, Trotsky and his fellow negotiators at Brest-Litovsk nonetheless did recognize the UPR, in fact several times. And, as several historians, both contemporary and later ones have concluded, this clearly reluctant concession on the part of the Bolsheviks was one whose legacy they continued to struggle with in the debates over the constitution of a future Soviet Union, what sorts of state forms to create to accommodate the new situation after formal empire was over, but not the neo-colonial relations of the past. Before that constitution brought

the four republics (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Transcaucasian Federation) into one Union, relations between the Soviet Ukraine that was finally established with Soviet Russia by 1920 were conducted by bilateral treaties.

And to return once more to Christopher Clark's evocation of the First World War as 'a modern event' and 'the most complex of modern times', we might see the German occupation of Ukraine as a portent of the dilemmas of asymmetrical power relations created out of war and peace that involve a major power in the making of state and nation, while adhering – at least at times and on the part of some of the authorities overseeing the occupation – to international norms of sovereignty and national self-determination and facing political opposition from parliaments and the press at home. Compared to more recent occupations and state-building projects, the German and Austrian occupations were mercifully brief, though not necessarily less devastating for the populations subjected to those occupations. Almost by force of internal logic, wartime occupations assume the character of colonial regimes of exploitation and subordination, as the experience of the Central Powers in Ukraine during 1918 clearly and sadly illustrates.

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1 *Roman Szporluk*, Lenin, 'Great Russia,' and Ukraine; in: Harvard Ukrainian Studies 28/1–4 (2006) 611–626.

2 Haidamak was a general Soviet reference to anti-Soviet Ukrainian soldiers.

3 *Lapchinsky*, Z pershykh dniv [From the first days]; IDEM, Pershyi period radians'koi vlady na Ukraini. TsVKU ta Narodniy Sekretariiat (Spohady) [The first period of soviet power in Ukraine. The CECU and the People's Secretariat (Memoirs); in: IBID. 1 (1928) 160–175; and Borot'ba za Kyiv-sichen' 1918 r [The Battle for Kyiv: January 1918]; in: IBID. 2 (1928) 209–219.

4 *Antonov-Ovseenko*, Zapiski [Notes] I 154.

5 Pidhainy evaluates the best sources as those of the reports of the American consul Douglas Jenkins, and Austrian reports from Kyiv. See Pidhainy, Formation 599.

6 *Dmytro Doroshenko*, Moi spomyny pro nedavne-mynule 1914-1918 [My Reminiscences Concerning the Distant Past), 4 vols (Lviv 1923–1924) I 294.

7 *Lapchinskyi*, Borotba za [Battle] 219.

8 Lenin expressed confidence in Muraviov's success against the Romanians, and 'we don't for a minute doubt that the valiant heroes of the liberation of Kyiv will not delay in fulfilling their revolutionary duty'. Cf. doc. 17, 17 February 1918: Telegramma V. I. Lenina Glavnokomanduiushchemu M.A. Muraviov, Rumynskoi Verkhovnoi Kollegii, Narodnomu Sekretariatu Ukrainskoi Respubliki [Telegram from V. I. Lenin to Commander-in-Chief M. A. Muraviov, the Romanian Supreme Collegium, the People's Secretariat of the Ukrainian Republic]; in: Golunov (ed.), Direktivy [Directives] 17.

9 *Antonov-Ovseenko*, Zapiski [Notes] I 157 f.

10 Also not surprisingly, Ukrainian historians have assessed the war even more tragically; for Doroshenko 'the Bolsheviks instated such a bloodbath as the city had not seen since the days of Andrew Bogoliubskiy' (sack of Kyiv by Suzdal in 1169).
Serhiy O. Yefremov wrote an open letter to Yuri Kotsiubynskyi, son of a prominent Ukrainian writer: '[…] the seed you planted on your native soil shall not bring forth what you expect, not equality and fraternity, but knives on both sides, hatred and blood'. Cited in Pidhainy, Formation 616 f.

11 *Khrystiuk*, Zamitky [Notes] II 181–184.

12 On the Polish reaction to the secret treaty provisions dealing with Kholm province, see Hornykiewicz (ed.), Ereignisse II 229–275: 'Aufregung in Polen wegen Angliederung Cholms an die Ukraine'.

13 Fedyshyn notes that 'this was very likely the earliest expression of the cordon sanitaire idea'. Cf. Fedyshyn, Drive to the East 77.

14 IBID. 100, for a discussion of the 'open rivalry that seriously strained relations between Berlin and Vienna'.

15 IBID. 87.

16 Hoffmann wrote that 'if the Central Powers, who had made peace with the Ukraine for the sake of bread wanted to get bread, they would have to go and fetch it'. He described the Ukrainian representatives as in a desperate position and that they 'quite openly begged assistance from Germany'. In his opinion, this was a logical next step: '[…] after recognizing the government and signing a peace with it, we had therefore to see that the peace we had signed was carried out, and for this purpose the first thing we had to do was to support the Government that had concluded the peace with us'. Hoffmann, Lost Opportunities 230.

17 *BIHL*, Friedensschlüsse von Brest-Litovsk 198.

18 The appeal was drafted by the one Ukrainian delegate left in Brest-Litovsk, Liubynskyi.

[19] *Hornykiewicz* (ed.), Ereignisse II 276–290.

[20] *BIHL*, Friedensschlüsse von Brest-Litovsk 126.

[21] See several fascinating documents, including Chancellor von Hertling's submission of the treaty, speeches by Reichstag deputies, and Kühlmann's statements; in: Ralph Haswell Lutz (ed.), Fall of the German Empire, 1914–1918, 2 vols. (= Hoover War Library publications 1–2, New York 1969) I 802–828. Kühlmann's statements, summarized here, are dated February 19 and 20, 1918. See Seidler's speech, 19 February 1918, Vienna; in: Hornykiewicz (ed.), Ereignisse I 287–290, doc. 116. Seidler's remarks focused on the grain and other foodstuffs from Ukraine that were the primary gain of the peace and, as had been anticipated, had to answer the protests of the 'gentlemen of the Polish club' about the concessions on the Kholm region. In defense of his government's treaty, however, he reminded the Polish gentlemen that the issue of ethnic border setting would be a matter for a mixed commission at a later date.

[22] A report on the situation in Ukraine by Colin Ross, a German reporter who had 'embedded' with the front-line troops of the German occupation forces entering Ukraine, was one of many alarming pieces of intelligence that Berlin received. Ross concluded that the Rada government initially depended entirely on the German occupation, but that it was gaining in authority with every day. Nonetheless, he wrote of a complete lack of central government with any meaningful control over the territory, that the Bolsheviks had more support than just their bayonets, and that the Ukrainian national movement had very weak roots. See a Russian translation of the German document: Doklad nachalniku operatsionnogo otdeleniia Germanskogo vostochnogo fronta o polozhenii del na Ukraine v marte 1918 g. [Report to the Head of the Operational Department of the German Eastern Front]; in: Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii [Archiv of the Russian Revolution] 22 vols. (Berlin 1922–1937) I (1922) 368–376.

[23] *Horak* summarizes the speeches of the leading party spokesmen in the Reichstag, including: Adolf Groeber (Centrum), Eduard David (Social Democrats), Gustav Stresemann (National Liberals), and Kuno von Westarp (Conservatives), comprising an overwhelming majority in favor of the treaty; and Marian Seyda, representing the Poles, and Georg Lebedour (left-wing Independent Social Democrats) opposing it. See Horak, The First Treaty 91–99.

[24] *Fedyshyn*, Drive to the East 95. See Holubovychs report to Small Rada, 1 February 1918 (already in Zhytomyr) on the peace treaty and the additional convention on military aid with Germany; in: Verstiuk, Ostashko (eds.), Ukrainska Tsentralna Rada [Ukrainian Central Rada] II (1997) 155, doc. 77. Sevriuk reported on the negotiations with the Austrian and German governments about military aid and amendments to the peace agreements. IBID. 156, doc. 78.

[25] For a view of this conflict more sympathetic to Vienna's positions, see BIHL, Friedensschlüsse von Brest-Litovsk 106–113.

[26] Vidozva Rady Narodnykh Ministriv do hromadian UNR [Appeal of the Council of People's Ministers to the Citizens of the UPR], 10 February 1918; in: Verstiuk, Ostashko (eds.) Ukrainska Tsentralna Rada [Ukrainian Central Rada] II 160 f., doc. 81. For a different view of the coalition of the occupying forces, see Antonov-Ovseenko, citing a report from military sources: '[…] at the front were organized units of haidamaks of mixed composition, large participation of officers, including Russians, Germans, Ukrainians, Austrians, Poles, and Hungarians; behind them came haidamak forces, forward haidamak units, supported by two German regiments.' See Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski [Notes] II 9.

[27] This section is based on the long available but largely unknown work by several scholars, including: XENIA JOUKOFF EUDIN, The German Occupation of the Ukraine in 1918; in: The Russian Review I/1 (November 1941) 90–105; TARAS Hunczak, The Ukraine Under Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi; in: Idem (ed.), The Ukraine 61–81; already mentioned have been the works of Fedyshyn, Drive to the East; Peter Borowsky, Deutsche Ukrainepolitik 1918 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Wirtschaftsfragen (= Historische Studien 416, Lübeck – Hamburg 1970); the memoirs of the German occupation commander, Wilhelm Groener; and two remarkable studies by eyewitness participants in the occupation by Austria-Hungary, Gustav Gratz, Richard Schüller, Die äussere Wirtschaftspolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns: Mitteleuropäische Plaene (Wien 1925); engl.: The economic policy of Austria-Hungary during the war in its external relations (= Economic and social history of the World War 4, New Haven 1928); and by the commanders of the Austro-Hungarian occupation army in Ukraine, Alfred Krauß, and Franz Klingenbrunner, also formerly in the command of the Eastern Front, the chapter, Die Besetzung der Ukraine 1918; in: Die Militärverwaltung in den von den österreichisch-ungarischen Truppen besetzten Gebieten (= Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte des Weltkrieges, österreichische und ungarische Serie, herausgegeben von der Carnegie-Stiftung, Wien – New Haven 1928) 359–390. Finally, I have written a chapter about this period in: Mark von Hagen, War in a European Borderland: Occupations and Occupation Plans in Galicia and Ukraine, 1914–1918 (= Donald W. Treadgold Studies on Russia, East Europe, and Central Asia, Seattle – London 2007) 87–104.

[28] *Khrystiuk*, Zamitky [Notes] 156.

[29] See Ludendorff's 'General Directives of the Administration and Exploitation of the Occupied Eastern regions after the Conclusion of the Peace Treaty', part B devoted to Ukraine, March 18, 1918, discussed in Fedyshyn, Drive to the East 113 f.

[30] IBID. 108–110.

[31] Groener admitted that he, too, knew nothing about Ukraine. Cf. Wilhelm Groener, Lebenserinnerungen: Jugend, Generalstab, Weltkrieg, ed. by Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen (Göttingen 1957) 385 f. He did have two political advisors, both Russian-speaking intelligence experts, Major [Otto] Hasse and Major Walter Jarosch; '[…] the two officers were destined to play a much more important role in Ukrainian affairs than their rank and titles would suggest'. Fedyshyn, Drive to the East 108. On Mumm, Paul Rohrbach, who knew Mumm from working together with him at the Foreign Ministry Central Office during the war, said after a visit to Kyiv in 1918: 'He had no understanding for our reports and wished us to be out of Kyiv as soon as possible.' Elsewhere, he self-deprecatingly brushes off a flattering reference to him by a Russian-Jewish journalist from a Kyiv Social Democratic newspaper as 'Count [sic] Rohrbach, the creator of Ukraine who had come to see his creation'. See PAUL ROHRBACH, Um des Teufels Handschrift: Zwei Menschenalter erlebter Weltgeschichte (Hamburg 1953) 221.

[32] *Fedyshyn*, Drive to the East 103 ff.
[33] *Groener*, Lebenserinnerungen 385, as translated by Fedyshyn, Drive to the East 107.
[34] *Krauss'* report dated June 13, 1918; in: Hornykiewicz (ed.), Ereignisse III 119.
[35] *Horak*, The First Treaty 107.
[36] *Hornykiewicz* (ed.), Ereignisse III 28 f., 35 ff., 57–60, and elsewhere, cites several cases of Austrian objections to German plans for outright occupation and the removal of the Hetman government.
[37] *Groener*, Lebenserinnerungen 397. For some of the key documents of the 'hard approach' see Die deutsche Okkupation; this contains the German-language documents that were collected by Soviet historians M. Gorkii, I. Mintz, R. Eideman (eds.), Krakh germanskoi okkupatsii na Ukraine (po dokumentam okkupantov) [The Collapse of the German Occupation in Ukraine (in the documents of the occupiers)] (Moscow 1936). And for Eichhorn's order to the German troops, see Hornykiewicz (ed.), Ereignisse III 50 f.
[38] *Fedyshyn*, Drive to the East 112, citing a March 10, 1918, telegram from Bernhard von Bülow in Brest-Litovsk to Berlin. Despite Mumm's support for the Ukrainian government, he also expressed his frustrations with the 'pseudo-government' of the Rada and its 'communist experiments'. See Die deutsche Okkupation 42, doc. 11.
[39] *Fedyshyn* summarizes the Austro-Hungarian views of Ambassador Count János Forgách, Count Ottokar Czernin and Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst as very hostile to Ukraine; 'The country was to be exploited economically and then abandoned, possibly to be reincorporated into Russia.' Fedyshyn, Drive to the East 119 f. See the frequent and often lengthy reports of Forgách back to Vienna in Hornykiewicz (ed.), Ereignisse III, docs. 529 (98–106), 550 (138), 552 (139–141), 554 (141–147).
[40] *Kühlmann*, temporarily distracted with negotiations in Bucharest, came to Mumm's support against his War Ministry and Austrian colleagues. Fedyshyn, Drive to the East 114 f.
[41] He suggested that Paul Rohrbach, a Ukraine expert, accompany the Social-Democratic deputies to Kyiv. Fedyshyn reports that Stolzenberg's military colleagues in Kyiv were openly critical of his 'softness and undue indulgence' toward the Ukrainians; cf. Fedyshyn, Drive to the East 135. Rohrbach actually visited Kyiv only after the coup that overthrew the Rada government. See a discussion of his letters from Kyiv in HENRY CORD MEYER, Germans in the Ukraine, 1918: Excerpts from Unpublished Letters; in: American Slavic and East European Review 9 (April 1950) 105–115.
[42] For the report of the Ukrainian peace delegation to the Rada, 9 March 1918, on the negotiations with the Russians and on the matter of the Austrian and German occupation forces, their numbers and obligations to treat Ukraine as a friendly power, see Verstiuk, Ostashko (eds.), Ukrains'ka Tsentral'na Rada [Ukrainian Central Rada] II 184–188, doc. 99 (Liubyns'kyi, Sevriuk, and Levyts'kyi all address the government).
[43] Fedyshyn, Drive to the East 120, 126.
[44] IBID. 137. See further discussions of German attitudes towards the new state and the debates between Groener and Eichhorn, on one hand, and Mumm, on the other; IBID. 148 ff. Hoffmann, too, continued to follow Ukrainian affairs and was troubled by Groener and Eichhorn's efforts, which he believed were 'driving Ukraine back into the arms of Great Russia'.
[45] *Hornykiewicz* (ed.), Ereignisse I 400 ff.
[46] *Matthias Erzberger*, My 'Offensive' in the Main Committee, 14 May 1918; in: Lutz (ed.), Fall of the German Empire I 853 ff. For a discussion of Erzberger's politics at this time, see Klaus Epstein, Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy (Princeton 1959) 239–244.
[47] *Forgách*, too, frequently noted the pro-Russian orientation of the Hetman's government and was also part of Mumm's efforts to get more Ukrainian parties to join the cabinet. See Hornykiewicz (ed.), Ereignisse III 138–141, docs. 550 ff.
[48] Speech of Vice-Chancellor Friedrich von Payer in the Main Committee of the Reichstag on the Eastern Questions, 7 May 1918, in: LUTZ (ed.) Fall of the German Empire 846–852.
[49] *Hornykiewicz* (ed.), Ereignisse III 74 ff. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador Forgách described the relationship as 'eine Art stillschweigendes Protektorat'.
[50] *Maximilian*, Prince of Baden, The Memoirs of Prince Max of Baden, 2 vols. (London 1928) II 274.
[51] *Max Hoffmann*, War Diaries and Other Papers, 2 vols. (London 1929) I 246.
[52] *Hoffmann*, Lost Opportunities 236.
[53] 'Ethical imperialism' was von Baden's answer to modern demands for democracy and national self-determination: 'The wave of democracy threatens to wash away the foundations of all Imperialism. This threat is specially dangerous to German imperialism, which does not yet exist and has still to be created. It may therefore be said that if German Imperialism is to withstand the assault of democracy with its claim to a better world it must base itself on ethical principles.' See Maximilian, Memoirs I 281.
[54] *Fischer*, Germany's Aims 508: HOFFMANN, Lost Opportunities 229.
[55] *Rohrbach*, Teufels Handschrift 219 f. Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative (Boston – New York 1921) 99.
[56] 'I would ask the President of the United States what right he has to put himself forward as judge of the world? [...] President Wilson has no right to do battle in the name of the small nations, since the alien peoples which were threatened with extinction under the Russian tyranny, the Finns, the Poles, the Ukrainians, the Balts, the Lithuanians, have turned to him in vain over and over again.' Maximilian, Memoirs I 186 f.
[57] See *Khrystiuk's* chapter on the French-UPR 'negotiations'; Khrystiuk, Zamitky [Notes] 91–108. For an example of a growing recent literature on the anti-colonial movement and another lost opportunity, the Wilsonian moment, see Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford – New York 2007).